The Chinese Media Framing of the 2015’s Tianjin Explosion by Yan, Li & Lidong, Lin
23
The Chinese Media Framing of the 2015’s Tianjin Explosion
Li Yan & Lin Lidong
Shanghai International Studies University
No. 1550 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang District, Shanghai, 2 01600, China
Email: liyan02260@163.com
Abstract: This study compares the framing’s patterns of the Chinese traditional media and social 
media in reporting the incident of Tianjin explosion in 2015. Applying frame-building and frame-
setting theory, this study explores the interplay between online opinions available on Weibo and the 
Chinese newspapers in different phases of the crisis event. Moreover, it examines the differences in 
framing the incident between the state-owned party media and the commercial media. The results 
reveal that various frames applied by different Chinese media in reporting the incident. A complex 
interplay between Weibo, the Communist-owned and the commercial happened, including frame-
building, frame-setting, and frame-interacting effects. 
Keywords: comparative media, frame building, frame setting, media framing, Tianjin incident
Abstrak: Penelitian ini membandingkan framing dari media konvensional sosial di Cina dalam 
memberitakan insiden ledakan di Tianjin pada tahun 2015. Menggunakan teori frame-building dan 
frame-setting, penelitian ini mengeksplorasi hubungan antara opini online dalam Weibo dengan 
surat kabar Cina, baik yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah maupun swasta dalam fase krisis yang 
berbeda-beda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa berbagai frame digunakan oleh media Cina 
dalam pemberitaan yang memengaruhi satu sama lain, termasuk frame-building, frame-setting, 
dan frame-interacting effects.
Kata Kunci: frame building, frame setting, insiden Tianjin, media framing, media komparatif 
With the proliferation of various social 
media platforms, the journalism has been 
redefi ned (Lin, 2013) and online discourses 
have become an important research topic 
(Luo, 2014). Media scholars have raised 
the questions, whether or not the agenda-
setting and framing theories could be 
applied continuously in the era of new media 
(Matei, 2010). As such, they question on 
how online public opinions would impact 
on traditional media coverage such as 
newspapers (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
Previous studies have examined the interplay 
between the traditional media and the new 
media platforms such as Twitter (Conway, 
Kenski & Wang, 2015), Facebook (Etter 
& Vestergaard, 2015), online forum (Zhou 
& Moy, 2007) and political blog (Meraz, 
2011). Those researches demonstrate that 
the social media have infl uenced the public 
opinions, but how they function remains 
unclear, since the convergence between the 
new and the traditional media are blurred 
(Lin, 2013). 
The social media like Twitter and 
Facebook are offi cially blocked in China. 
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There is one local social media application, 
Weibo that is considered as Chinese version 
of Twitter, becomes the alternate and one 
of the most important platforms for online 
public opinions. As we acknowledged that, 
the media system in China is less open than in 
western countries under the strong censorship 
of the Chinese government. For so long, 
the Chinese media have been considered 
as “mouthpiece” of the Communist party 
(Zhao, 1998). However, some researchers 
have argued that Chinese media no longer 
merely serves the Party, nor are the Chinese 
audience (Yu, 2011; Wang, 2013). Under 
this context, it is necessary to compare 
and examine the relationship between the 
online public opinions on Weibo and the 
news coverage on mainstream Chinese 
media in order to see whether there are any 
differences in interpreting the same issue. It 
is also important to look at how those media 
infl uence each other.
To answer the above questions, this 
paper conducted a case study of China’s 
biggest national crisis event in 2015, which 
is China Tianjin Explosions tragedy. It 
occurred on 12 August 2015 and killed 
173 people, including 95 fi refi ghters 
(Tianjin explosion, 2015; Sun, 2016). 
Weibo played an important role throughout 
this national incident. The posts related 
to Tianjin Explosions on Weibo added to 
66,941,357 in the fi rst month. Some of the 
victims released original videos, photos 
of the explosions and shared their own 
experiences through Weibo, which aroused 
heated discussion and refl ection among 
netizens (Accountability in China, 2015).
Researchers found that when reporting 
a crisis event, media not only transmit 
crisis message but also interpret the story 
(Driedger, 2008), and social media have 
different focus in presenting the crisis 
compared with traditional media (Driedger, 
2008; Littlefi eld & Quenette, 2007; Zhou & 
Moy, 2007). Therefore, the paper took this 
important crisis event for case study, and 
applied frame analysis to discover whether 
there is any difference between Weibo 
and traditional mainstream newspapers in 
framing this incident. The study analyzed 
the pattern of frames presented in different 
phases, which started from the beginning, 
middle and end of the crisis. It aims to 
demonstrate how the media frames salience 
evolves on both Weibo and the traditional 
newspapers, and to what extent online 
opinion on Weibo infl uences the newspaper 
coverage or vice versa.
Both of the agenda-setting and framing 
theories examine the infl uence of media 
toward the public. The former focuses more 
on issue salience, and the later focuses 
on frame salience in interpreting the 
issue (Zhou & Moy, 2007, p.81). The two 
approaches have certain common grounds 
where McCombs, Shaw & Weaver (1997) 
considered framing as second-level agenda 
setting. 
Entman (1993, h.51) describes framing 
as selecting and emphasizing certain 
aspects of experience or ideas over others. 
With this, journalists can set the priorities 
for information related to relevance, 
newsworthiness and create agendas (Norris, 
1995). Frames are like a “story angle” 
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which is signifi cant and helps audience 
to interpret, evaluate and judge the event, 
helps audience to think and discuss the 
events (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Similar 
to agenda-setting effect, frame-setting 
researchers have also found evidence for 
news frames’ affect on people’s perception 
and understood an issue (Pan & Kosicki, 
1993; Jasperson, Shah, Watts, Faber & Fan, 
1998). Exposure to “differently valence 
news frames” could lead to opinion change, 
and repetition of a news frame especially 
a negative frame strengthens the framing 
effect and makes it durable (Lecheler, Keer, 
Andreas, Schuck & Hänggli, 2015). 
According to de Vreese (2005, h. 51-
52), frame building is about the factors 
that infl uence the structural qualities of 
news frames. Both internal (i.e. journalistic 
routines, professionalism, etc.) and external 
factors (i.e. political values, cultural 
backgrounds, etc.) infl uenced frame-
building process (Zhou & Moy, 2007; Hong 
& Choi, 2010). Meanwhile, online public 
opinion is one of the important external 
factors infl uencing journalists’ framing 
process of news coverage, especially in 
today’s new media era. When examining 
the relationship between online opinion and 
media coverage, Gamson and Modigliani 
(1989) described the online discussion as 
a “value-added process”. Frame building 
is conceptualized as the impact of online 
public opinion on traditional media 
coverage, since social media could serve as 
sources for media practitioners and play an 
important role in news production. In turn, 
frame-setting describes the power of media 
frames used by journalists in infl uencing 
netizens’ interpretation of a certain issue 
(Zhou & Moy, 2007, p.82). Zhou and Moy 
(2007, p.93-94) also argued that in China, 
the external pressure from the party and the 
government might exert a greater impact 
on news framing. Thus, this study applied 
frame analysis to explore how the online 
opinion on Weibo and media coverage in 
mainstream newspapers interact, framed 
and interpreted during Tianjin explosions 
crisis in 2015.
When it comes to frame analysis, 
there were several different approaches 
utilized by scholars to examine framing 
effect even though some conceptualization 
and operationalization process remained 
scattered in current literature. Main types 
of frame analysis include the examination 
of issue-specifi c frames, generalizable 
frames and combination of these two. 
There are several ways to categorize the 
generalizable frames. Firstly, Semetko 
and Valkenburg (2000) who used fi ve 
frames to analyze European politics 
(attribution of responsibility, human-
interest frame, confl ict frame, morality 
frame, and economic frames). Secondly, 
this approach also appeared in Wasike’s 
(2013) study of news in Twitter. Another 
categorization is gain-based versus loss-
based frames as well as self-referential 
versus other-referential frames (Boydstun 
& Glazier, 2013). Last, there is Entman’s 
(1993) classic clarifi cation of frames in 
four dimensions, which are about defi ning 
problems, diagnosing causes, making 
moral judgments and suggesting remedies. 
Jurnal
ILMU KOMUNIKASI
26
VOLUME 14, NOMOR 1, Juni 2017: 23-42
Among those different frame-analysis 
devices, this study chose Entman’s frame 
clarifi cation that is suitable for exploring 
crisis frames. Some researchers also applied 
Entman’s method and conceptualized crisis 
frames as the frequency and association of 
an actor with an attribution and analyzed 
the problem, the responsibility of the 
cause, and the solutions of the crisis (Etter 
& Vestergaard, 2015). Besides, inspired by 
Boydstun & Glazier’s (2013), two-tiered 
method for identifying media framing, this 
study combined analysis of generic frames 
and issue-specifi c frames, and clusters of 
issue-specifi c frames were categorized into 
four generalizable frames (Entman, 1993).
Meanwhile, with the rise of the 
Internet, the question has been raised up, 
whether agenda-setting or framing theories 
still apply to social media (Matei, 2010). 
Social media are being used to circulate 
information without having to rely on 
traditional media to act as gatekeeper, 
fact-checker, or moderator (Metzgar & 
Marrugi, 2009). But when examining the 
infl uence of social media toward traditional 
media, this power is so complex that one 
cannot say that the new media completely 
reverses traditional media’s agenda setting 
ability. No one also can describe who the 
real agenda setter is, since diverging results 
occurred according the different choices 
of social media tools (Etter & Vestergaard, 
2015).
Conway et al. (2015) assessed the 
relationship between newspaper articles 
and Twitter feeds of political candidates 
and parties during 2012 US presidential 
primary. They found that the infl uence 
between the two was symbiotic and 
reciprocal, and the Twitter feeds succeeded 
in predicting newspaper agendas in some 
specifi c topics. Furthermore, Jungherr 
(2014) has compared Twitter and traditional 
media in political communication and 
raised the notion of different logic of 
political coverage in this hybrid media 
system. Particular characteristic of a certain 
media platform allows for specifi c modes of 
information production and consumption. 
It is necessary for exploring the peculiarity 
of a certain media platform under different 
political and social contexts in various 
countries. 
Studies (Sayre, Bode, Shah, Wilcox 
& Shah, 2010) have done examination 
about the impact of another prominent new 
media platform, YouTube, toward online 
and conventional news coverage and found 
out that correlation between YouTube and 
media news changed dramatically along 
with the timeline. Korean researchers 
examined the infl uence of internet bulletin 
boards on newspapers in covering 2000 
general election of South Korea (Lee, 
Lancendorfer & Lee, 2005). Results 
demonstrated that newspapers remain the 
main infl uencer of online bulletin regarding 
issue agendas, whereas the impact of 
internet bulletin toward newspaper 
coverage was found when examining 
attribute agendas. Therefore, the interaction 
between social media and traditional media 
could differ when social media platforms 
and examined subjects are different. 
For example, Meraz (2011) affi rms that 
27
Li Yan & Lin Lidong. The Chinese Media...
agenda-setting ability of political blogs and 
its resistance of traditional media’s agenda-
setting effect. Whereas another study (Etter 
& Vestergaard, 2015) investigating how 
Facebook and news media frame a corporate 
crisis indicates that news media remains a 
stronger frame-setter while little evidence 
was found for Facebook’s impact on 
traditional media. Different from fi ndings 
in political fi eld, this result indicates that 
though great in number, Facebook turns out 
to be less infl uential in framing corporation 
crisis.
We applied frame building and frame 
setting perspectives to explore the interplay 
between social media and traditional news 
media. Frame-building was relatively less 
investigated because of the diffi culty to test 
(Hong & Choi, 2010), but the fl ourish of 
online communities provides another public 
opinion fi eld to assess the frame-building 
process. A bidirectional relationship was 
found between news media and social media, 
and frame setting effect was supported with 
news media mainly setting crisis frames of 
online public (Etter & Vestergaard, 2015). 
Facebook netizens apply different crisis 
frames compared with conventional media 
but its frame-building power remains limited. 
It is rather the news media that exert the 
frame-setting effect on social media (Etter 
& Vestergaard, 2015). In political fi eld, 
politicians frame political issues in social 
media through the frequency of talking about 
certain issues and the use of hashtags within 
them (Hemphill, Culotta & Heston, 2013). 
An evidence was been found for frame-
setting effect that repetitive news frames have 
a strong and persistent impact on people’s 
political opinions (Lecheler et al., 2015). 
Regarding to the Chinese online 
discourse, Weibo, the most infl uential 
microblog in China, is also examined by 
scholars (Wu, Atkin, Mou, Lin & Lau, 
2013). They investigated the agenda-setting 
process between Weibo and newspapers in 
reporting Wenzhou train crash accident in 
2011. Study found that Weibo became the 
main information sources of newspapers 
shortly after the national accident, and the 
agenda-setting power of Weibo was found 
with one-day time lag. Researcher Ying 
Jiang examined how the trending topics 
on Weibo affected the stated-controlled 
media in China and found out that Weibo 
served as an important platform for citizen 
participation and expression of public 
opinion. However, the state still set the 
boundary for what is allowed for criticism 
(Ying, 2014). Another study tested the 
correlation between online public opinion 
(online forum) and media coverage in 
different phases through both generic 
and issue-specifi c frame analysis of the 
controversial BMW case 2003 in China 
(Zhou & Moy, 2007, p.92-94). Findings 
suggested online opinion could exert frame-
building function for new issues when there 
is inadequate information at the beginning 
of the incident and found signifi cant frame-
interacting effect. However, online opinion 
frames remained independent from media 
frames, which indicated little frame-setting 
effect of traditional media. Researchers 
partially attributed this result to netizens’ 
low level of trust in Chinese media entities.
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In the context of reporting of the crisis 
events, not only do the media transmit 
crisis messages, they can also actively 
interpret the story by selecting elements of 
a story that they reported and deciding how 
a story can be packaged (Driedger, 2008). 
For instance, traditional media tend to 
highlight macroeconomic impact, victims, 
governments’ handling and lessons learned, 
as all these can capture attention and add 
news values in crisis reporting (Driedger, 
2008; Littlefi eld & Quenette, 2007). This 
study chose a Chinese crisis event to 
explore the differences that have appeared 
in reporting the event between a social 
media, Weibo, and the Chinese mainstream 
newspapers.
Besides, it is important to point out 
that Chinese media landscape is different 
from the western countries and media have 
been considered as the “mouthpiece” of the 
government and the Party (Zhao, 1998). 
After the 1970s reforms and transformations, 
Chinese media is characterized by the 
fusion of Party control and market power 
(Zhao, 2004). For example, People’s daily 
is considered as the offi cial newspaper of 
the Chinese Communist Party that provides 
information on policies and government 
standpoints. There are also other regional 
or trans-regional commercial newspapers 
(i.e. Beijing News) aiming at profi t-making 
while responding to public opinion. These 
media were considered as engaging in a 
“tug of war” between Party and capitalism 
(Zhao, 1998, p.17-18). Taking this dual 
system of Chinese media into consideration, 
this paper also explores whether there 
is any difference between Communist 
party media and commercial media when 
reporting a crisis event. 
Taking into account the specialty 
of Chinese media system and aiming at 
exploring how Chinese-characterized social 
media, Weibo differs from and infl uences 
Chinese mainstream media, this study puts 
forward three research questions (RQ):
1. Did Chinese commercial media 
(Beijing News) use more attributions of 
responsibility frame than the Chinese 
party owned media (People’s daily)?
2. Were there any differences on their 
framing pattern between the mainstream 
newspapers and a social media, Weibo, 
in covering the issue within the different 
phases of the accident?
3. To what extent does a social media, 
Weibo, has infl uenced the mainstream 
newspapers, or vice versa, in the frame 
building and frame setting processes?
METHODS
This research is a cross-sectional case 
study between a social media (i.e. Weibo) 
and the traditional media in framing the 
2015’s China Tianjin Explosion. Through 
a combination of generic and issue-
specifi c frame analysis, the clusters of 
issue-specifi c frames were categorized 
into four generalizable frames according 
to Entman’s (1993) clarifi cation: defi ning 
problems, diagnosing causes, making 
moral judgments, and suggesting remedies. 
The Tianjin explosion occurred on 12 
August 2015. To analyze the frame patterns 
29
Li Yan & Lin Lidong. The Chinese Media...
along with the time line, the researcher 
collected data for a period of 15 days, from 
12 until 26 August 2015 then divided it into 
fi ve phases with a time span of 3 days. In 
both framing and agenda-setting research, 
determining the time span for examining the 
potential correlation or interaction effects has 
been part of methodological controversy. The 
time span for examining framing or agenda-
setting effects of new media varies from one 
to seven days (Roberts, Wanta & Dzwo, 
2002), which is much shorter than the time 
lag of traditional inter-media effect. After 
searching for number of newspaper articles 
and Weibo posts in this half of a month, 
we found on both platforms the number of 
articles or online posts peaked in the fi rst 
three days, and then started decreasing with a 
little fl uctuation. Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the 
number of articles and Weibo posts from the 
1st until 15th day, and Figure 3 shows the trend 
of online posts from the 4th to 15th day when 
the number slumped signifi cantly compared 
with the fi rst three days.
Figure 1 Number of News Article in Traditional Media from 1st until 15th day
Figure 2 Number of Weibo Post from 1st until 15th day
Figure 3 Number of News Article in Traditional Media from 4th until 15th day
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There is a relatively obvious change of 
number on both platforms every three days. 
Taking all above into consideration, we 
divided our research period into 5 phases 
with a 3-day time span as shown in the chart 
below to investigate possible interaction 
between various phases.
Table 1 Five Phases During the Period of the Tianjin 
Explosion Event
Phase Date (Traditional Media & Weibo)
Phase 1 Aug. 12-14,2015
Phase 2 Aug. 15-17,2015
Phase 3 Aug. 18-20,2015
Phase 4 Aug. 21-23,2015
Phase 5 Aug. 24-26,2015
Source: Primary data
To investigate the interplay between 
traditional media and Weibo, as well as 
the difference between Communist party 
media and commercial media, news articles 
in People’s daily and the Beijing News 
(Xinjing Bao) were collected and coded. 
People’s daily is the biggest newspaper 
group in China and an offi cial newspaper 
of the Chinese Communist Party, while 
The Beijing News is one of the best-selling 
and trans-regional newspapers that paid 
great attention to Tianjin blast with a high 
number of related articles being published. 
After searching with key word “Tianjin 
Explosions in Chinese” in Huike database, 
we collected 21 news articles in People’s 
daily and 44 in The Beijing News in total. 
As for Weibo posts, we used a web 
crawler software (Gooseeker) to collect 
all the Weibo posts containing key word 
Tianjin Explosions. After manually 
fi ltering all the offi cial government, media 
and corporation accounts, we selected the 
most reposted 30 Weibo posts each day, 
which represented the most popular online 
opinion, and obtained 450 posts (15 days) 
in total for content analysis. 
The unit of analysis of this study is 
newspaper articles and Weibo posts. When 
the post turned out to be a link of an article, 
the article was coded as unit of analysis. As 
mentioned previously, this study applied 
the two-tiered method for framing analysis 
through categorizing several issue-specifi c 
frames into four generic frames. The 
chart below shows our defi nition of four 
generic frames and issue-specifi c frames 
categorized into each.
Table 2 Coding Reference for Identifying Generic or Issue-Specifi c Frames
Generic fame Issue-specifi c frames
Defi ning problems
(Defi ne the nature of the problem or clarify key 
facts related to the problem)
1. Illustrate facts related to the Tianjin Explosions
2. Echo and trust reports by the authorities.
3. Question the aforementioned facts and offi cial statement
Diagnosing causes
(Identify underlying forces of the problem)
1. Poor governmental regulation or government corruption.
2. Illegal operation of the corporation
3. Connection between corporation and authorities
Making moral judgments
(Make moral judgments or portray from human 
interest perspective)
1. Express feelings of outrage, sympathy or compassion.
2. Indicate how individuals or groups are affected.
Suggesting remedies
(Propose solutions or discuss possible results)
1. Call for a reinvestigation.
2. Emphasize the role of the media and the public opinion.
3. Advocate greater transparency and sense of responsibility in 
corporation and governmental rule.
4. Promote the development of social service systems, including 
compensation, insurance. Etc.
Source: Primary data
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Besides identifying frames, length of 
the news articles, story types (these two 
only for newspaper articles), occurrence of 
responsibility frame, target of responsibility, 
and tone of articles or posts were coded 
as well. The occurrence of responsibility 
frame means the article or the post suggest 
that to some extent government or other 
groups or entities are responsible for the 
accident, and if the answer is yes, the coder 
was asked to further identify what was the 
main target of responsibility: government, 
corporations, specifi c groups or individuals, 
media and public opinion, or others.
The researchers used a binary coding 
strategy that is to use yes-no categories to 
measure the occurrence of each generic 
or issue-specifi c frame. The researchers 
coded the newspaper articles and Weibo 
posts according to the detailed codebook, 
and discussed with each other in case of 
uncertainty and disagreement. The inter-
coder reliability test was conducted on a 
random 10% of the sample of both media 
articles and Weibo posts and the averaged 
reliability was 85%.
All data were analyzed through SPSS 
software. To answer RQ1, data of traditional 
media were displayed in Crosstabs with 
Pearson’s Chi-Square test. To answer 
RQ2, all data were displayed in Crosstabs 
with Pearson’s Chi-Square test. While, to 
answer RQ3, the researcher separated and 
reorganized all data by phase and media genre 
(e.g. reorganizing data of Phase 1 Weibo 
and Phase 2 Press to test framing building 
effect) and test their Cross-Correlation with 
Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi cient.
FINDING
After comparing the frequency of 
responsibility frame, the frequency of this 
frame in Beijing News was 21.54% higher 
than in People’s daily (9.52%), though chi-
square test showed no signifi cant power of 
this variance (p >0.05). We further compared 
the target of responsibility in order to fi nd 
which actors being blamed in this tragedy. 
Beijing News directed this responsibility to 
more types of actors including government 
(11.36%), corporations where the 
explosions occurred (9.09%), and specifi c 
groups or individuals (4.55%). On the 
other side, the party media People’s daily 
only took government (9.52%) as their 
target though the percentage is lower than 
in Beijing News. These fi ndings show that 
the commercial media was more critical 
than the party media when reporting this 
crisis event and took a stronger stance in 
directing the criticism. 
To understand the difference of 
reporting style of these two newspapers, 
the researchers also compared the tone 
of news articles, story type, as well as 
story length and chi-square test proved 
signifi cant difference in two newspapers 
regarding all these three important 
elements in news reporting. Firstly, these 
two newspapers used signifi cantly different 
tone frames (i.e. positive, neutral, negative) 
(P<0.01) in covering Tianjin explosions. 
The rank of tone frequency in People’s 
daily: Neutral>Positive>Negative versus 
Beijing News: Neutral>Negative>Positive. 
Although they both applied neutral tone 
most frequently, People’s daily tended to 
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report this event in a more positive way, 
while Beijing News tended to be more 
negative. 
Secondly, they also showed extremely 
signifi cant difference (P<0.01) in regard 
to the distribution of three news types 
(including news report, feature, editorial). 
Different story types were better distributed 
in Beijing News, while in People’s daily the 
type of news report (57.14%) dominated 
the others. Meanwhile, Beijing News was 
more fl exible in applying various story 
types besides the typical ones, for example, 
popular science articles. 
Thirdly, the t-test showed signifi cant 
difference of average length of the reports 
in two newspapers: the coverage in Beijing 
News was signifi cantly longer than in 
People’s daily (P<0.05), which implied 
that greater importance was attached to this 
crisis event in commercial media.
As Table 4 showed the frequency 
of four generic frames on Weibo and 
mainstream newspapers along with the 
5 phases of the incident, the researchers 
detected and compared the tendency of 
frame patterns on two platforms.
The moral judgment frame dominated 
in the online discourse throughout the 
whole period though it decreased slightly 
as the event proceeded. Especially in the 
fi rst three phases, the percentage of moral 
judgments frame was more than 35% during 
the fi rst 3 days (phase 1) of the incident, 
later, this number even reached up to 40%. 
The netizens expressed feelings of outrage 
toward illegal operation of the company, 
compassion for victims and sacrifi ced 
fi refi ghters. 
In the second phase, the percentage of 
defi ning problems frame increased from 
24.1% (phase 1) to 35.5% (phase 2). The 
netizens started to focus on the fact-related 
information and asked about what really 
happened. From phase 3 and phase 4, the 
use of both defi ning problems and moral 
T able 3 Comparison of Frames between People’s daily and Beijing News
People’s daily Beijing News Sig.
Responsibility Frames
No 90.48% 78.46%
0.104>0.05
Yes 9.52% 21.54%
Tone
Positive 33.33% 15.38%
0.009<0.01Neutral 57.14% 61.54%
Negative 9.52% 23.08%
Target
No target 90.48% 75.00%
0.392>0.05
Government 9.52% 11.36%
Corporations 0.00% 9.09%
Specifi c groups or individuals 0.00% 4.55%
Type
News report 57.14% 25.00%
0.002<0.01
Feature 14.29% 27.27%
Editorial 28.57% 13.64%
Others 0.00% 34.09%
Length Words average 940.62 1493.23 0.038<0.05
Source: Primary data
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judgments frame decreased, while the 
diagnosing causes and suggesting remedies 
frame gradually mounted up. People 
switched their focus onto the “why” and 
“how” question, what was the reason of 
this tragedy, and how to solve this problem. 
During the last phase, the number of 
diagnosing causes frame slumped, and 
problem and moral frame declined as 
well. Instead, we found a sharp increase 
of suggesting remedy frame up to 45.8% 
(phase 5), which then tripled the number 
in phase 2 (15%). Moreover, suggesting 
remedies was the only frame that kept 
increasing from the beginning (phase 2) 
of the event. The netizens were keen to 
provide their suggestions and expected 
them to reach the policy level, and they 
also called for the role of media and public 
opinion to push forward the investigation 
and reform. 
The frame pattern presented by the 
mainstream newspapers was not the 
same as on social media. During the fi rst 
phase, defi ning problems frame was the 
most prominent frame (45.5%) followed 
by moral judgment frame (27.3%). 
Throughout the fi rst four phases, moral 
judgment frame remained in a relatively 
high level in traditional media and peaked 
in phase 3 (42.1%). Traditional media 
tended to apply issue-specifi c frames, 
such as “how individuals are affected” and 
“generate people’s feeling of compassion”. 
For example, one newspaper article 
went viral on social media, which highly 
complimented the courageous fi refi ghters 
and deeply mourned for those who sacrifi ced 
their lives. Traditional media managed to 
resonate with people’s sympathy through 
these individual human stories. The results 
did not show any obvious rise of diagnosing 
causes and suggesting remedies frame as 
the incident went on. 
It was the defi ning problems frame that 
increased dramatically up to 66.70% (phase 
5) during the last phase, dominating other 
three frames. The traditional media used 
more diagnosing causes frame than Weibo 
in the middle of the incident. It turned out 
that regarding this case, instead of providing 
solutions as social media, traditional media 
focused more on the factual information 
and the reason of the tragedy, especially 
during the latter period of the incident. This 
could be partially due to complexity of 
this crisis event itself, since the explosions 
were triggered by complicated chemical 
products and it took almost a year for the 
government to issue the fi nal investigation 
report. 
So, as the online discussion over 
the incident evolved to the latter stage, 
netizens were inclined to suggest solutions 
such as how to punish the company’s 
illegal operation, how to compensate 
the victim families, etc. Meanwhile, the 
traditional media still tended to provide 
factual information and insisted in asking 
the “why” question. Therefore, there was 
a clear difference between social media 
and traditional media regarding the frame 
pattern and salience, though chi-square 
test did not show signifi cant power for this 
variance. 
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Table 4 Comparison of Frames used by Traditional Media and Social Media
Generic Frames
Defi ning 
Problems1
Diagnosing Causes2
Making Moral 
Judgments3
Suggesting 
Remedies4
Sig.（Pearson 
Chi’s square)
Phase 1 Press 45.50% 13.60% 27.30% 13.60% 0.12>0.05
Weibo 24.10% 12.10% 40.50% 23.30%
Phase 2 Press 26.10% 17.40% 30.40% 26.10% 0.56>0.05
Weibo 35.00% 15.00% 35.00% 15.00%
Phase 3 Press 15.80% 26.30% 42.10% 15.80% 0.64>0.05
Weibo 28.00% 17.00% 39.00% 16.00%
Phase 4 Press 14.30% 28.60% 28.60% 28.60% 0.96>0.05
Weibo 22.00% 22.80% 28.50% 26.80%
Phase 5 Press 66.70% 0.00% 16.70% 16.70% 0.08>0.05
Weibo 21.20% 5.10% 28.00% 45.80%
Source: Primary data
This study tested whether the opinion 
frames at certain point in time are correlated 
with media frames at the same (Table 5) or 
another point in time (Table 6). Moreover, 
the study thoroughly examined the framing 
mechanism including effective time lag and 
found strong framing effect with both one-
phase (3 days) lag and two-phase (6 days) 
lag. There were in total 8 sets of signifi cant 
framing relationships (Figure 1). 
To test the frame building effect, we 
correlated Phase 1 Weibo with Phase 2 and 
Phase 3 Press; Phase 2 Weibo with Phase 
3 and Phase 4 Press; Phase 3 Weibo with 
Phase 4 and Phase 5 Press; and Phase 
4 Weibo with Phase 5 Press. Statistical 
analysis demonstrated a signifi cant negative 
correlation between Phase 2 Weibo and 
Phase 3 Press in terms of Defi ning Problems 
frame (r=-0.227, p<0.05). Phase 3 Weibo 
had a signifi cantly positive framing-
building effect on Phase 5 Press in terms of 
Defi ning Problems frame (r=0.231,p<0.05). 
Likewise, Phase 4 Weibo had a signifi cantly 
positive infl uence on building defi ning 
problems frame of Phase 5 Press (r=0.238, 
p<0.05). As showed in Table 6, Spearman 
correlations were not signifi cant between 
Phase 1 Weibo and Phase 2 Press (p>0.05), 
Phase 3 Weibo and Phase 4 Press (p>0.05), 
Phase 1 Weibo and Phase 3 Press (p>0.05), 
Phase 2 Weibo and Phase 4 Press (p>0.05), 
based on any generic frames. However, the 
researchers found some tendencies through 
the data: 
1) Weibo’s strong frame-building effect 
on press was demonstrated only 
on defi ning problems frame and its 
framing effect was negative on press 
in the middle period (Phase 2, 3, 
4) while positive in the last period 
(Phase 5). 
2) Weibo’s making moral judgments 
frames in all phases are negatively 
correlated with press’ in its 
corresponding phases, though the 
correlations were weak (P>0.05). 
3) As to diagnosing causes frame, the 
framing effect of Weibo was positive 
on press in the middle phases (Phase 
2, 3, 4) and then the effect became 
negative in the last period (Phase 5). 
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To examine frame-setting effect, we 
correlated Phase 1 Press with Phase 2 and 
Phase 3 Weibo, Phase 2 Press with Phase 
3 and Phase 4 Weibo, Phase 3 Press with 
Phase 4 and Phase 5 Weibo, and Phase 
4 Press with Phase 5 Weibo. Spearman 
correlation (Table 6) showed extremely 
signifi cantly negative framing effect of 
Phase 1 Press upon Phase 3 Weibo regarding 
defi ning problems frame (r=-0.259, 
p<0.01). Phase 3 Press had an extremely 
signifi cant negative frame-setting effect on 
Phase 5 Weibo, with regard to diagnosing 
causes frame (r=-0.260, p<0.01), while the 
framing effect became signifi cantly positive 
between them when it came to suggesting 
remedies frame (r=0.323, p<0.01). 
Another signifi cantly negative correlation 
was also found between the diagnosing 
causes frame of Phase 4 Press and Phase 
5 Weibo (r=-0.234, p<0.05). There was no 
signifi cant frame-setting effect (P>0.05) 
found in terms of making moral judgments. 
However, there was a tendency that press 
generally positively infl uenced the making 
moral judgments frame of Weibo across the 
time spans. 
As to the frame-interacting effect, 
signifi cant correlations between Weibo and 
press were found only during Phase 1 and Phase 
5 with regard to defi ning problems frame. 
However, during Phase 1, the interaction was 
extremely signifi cantly negative (r=-0.279, 
p<0.01), while signifi cantly negative (r=-
0.253, p<0.05) in Phase 5.
In general, results demonstrated a 
more sophisticated and powerful frame-
setting strategy than frame-building. In 
Phase 1 online public opinion, though 
tremendous and overwhelming, could not 
change the news media frames. On the 
other hand, news media responded very 
quickly since the crisis occurred and the 
public opinion exploded. In the Phase 1, 
news media fi rstly focused on defi ning 
problems when online discussion mainly 
focused on making moral judgments to 
calm down the netizens. This framing-
setting effect became strong on Phase 3 
Weibo by strongly increasing Weibo’s 
defi ning problems frame from Phase 1 to 
Phase 3. Thus, the researchers inferred that 
the direction of defi ning problems’ framing 
effect in Phase 1 was mainly from Weibo 
to press. 
In Phase 2, Weibo started to increase 
the defi ning problems, which then strongly 
decreased the news coverage about 
defi ning problem in Phase 3. Traditional 
media also increased its diagnosing causes 
and suggesting remedies frames in Phase 
3, which succeeded in diverting the public 
attention to make less diagnosing causes 
and suggest more remedies in Phase 5. 
Also, the decrease of news media’s use 
of diagnosing causes frame in Phase 4 
confi rmed its purpose to strongly decrease 
the online speculation of causes in the 
crisis. In the last phase, traditional media 
strongly increased the defi ning problems 
frame to make a summary of the crisis in 
response to online public opinion about the 
problem defi nitions in Phase 3. Thus, the 
researchers inferred that the direction of 
Defi ning Problems’ framing effect in Phase 
5 was from Weibo to press. 
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Table 5 Correlations between Weibo and Press Frames during the Same Phase
Weibo ↔ Press
Defi ning 
Problems1
Diagnosing 
Causes2
Making Moral 
Judgments3
Suggesting 
Remedies4
Phase 1 - 0.279** - 0.0312 0.105 0.089
Phase 2 0.13 0 0.091 - 0.093
Phase 3 0.119 - 0.082 -0.008 0.011
Phase 4 0.071 - 0.012 0.028 0.017
Phase 5 - 0.253* 0.061 0.078 0.181
Source: Primary data
Note: The bi-directional arrow means the direction of effect between Weibo and Press is uncertain or they have frames 
interaction between each other.
 ** Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 * Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 6 Correlations between Weibo and Press Frames with One/Two-PhaseLag
Generic Frames
Defi ning 
Problems1
Diagnosing 
Causes2
Making Moral 
Judgments3
Suggesting 
Remedies4
One-Phase 
Time Lag
P1 Weibo → P2 Press -0.009 0.046 -0.133 0
P2 Weibo → P3 Press -0.227* 0.071 -0.017 -0.031
P3 Weibo → P4 Press -0.076 0.088 -0.049 0.096
P4 Weibo → P5 Press 0.238* -0.152 -0.087 -0.078
P1 Press → P2 Weibo -0.140 0 0.047 0
P2 Press → P3 Weibo 0.009 -0.011 0.065 -0.118
P3 Press → P4 Weibo 0.111 0.027 -0.042 0.158
P4 Press → P5 Weibo 0.061 -0.234* 0.017 0.131
Two-Phase 
Time Lag
P1 Weibo → P3 Press -0.119 0.12 -0.058 -0.111
P2 Weibo → P4 Press -0.146 0.079 -0.065 0.079
P3 Weibo → P5 Press 0.231* -0.110 -0.105 0.013
P1 Press → P3 Weibo -0.259** -0.010 0.024 -0.020
P2 Press → P4 Weibo 0 0.094 0.031 0.054
P3 Press → P5 Weibo 0.094 -0.260* -0.06 0.323**
Source: Primary Data
Note: The direction the arrow points means the direction of the effect between Weibo and Press.
P is the abbreviation of “Phase” in the table, e.g. P1 means Phase 1.
 ** Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 * Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 1 Methodological Model of Frame Interaction between Weibo and Press
DISCUSSION
Considering diversity of the media 
landscape in China, this study utilized 
frame analysis to compare the coverage 
of Communist Party’s media, commercial 
media, as well as the online discourse in 
China’s most popular social media platform, 
Weibo. The researchers fi rstly compared 
the frames between the Communist 
Party’s newspaper and the commercial 
newspaper. In here, the researchers found 
a clear difference between the two on the 
coverage of the same crisis event (2015 
Tianjin Explosions), regarding the story 
angle, tone and length. Commercial media 
served more as a critical fact-fi nder than 
the party media. The former applied more 
frequently the attribution of responsibility 
frame and directed the criticism more 
equally to multiple actors. While the party 
media tended to portray the crisis event in 
a more positive way such as focusing on 
the compassionate human interest stories, 
and emphasized the role of government to 
build up a responsible government image. 
This difference between Chinese media 
outlets was consistent with former studies 
indicating that local media applied more 
frequently attribution frames to criticize 
government policies and cared more about 
audience’s feelings. On the other side, 
Communist Party’s media demonstrated 
more skillful in building government image 
(Yang, 2009; Yang, 2012). Furthermore, 
this trend is also consistent with China’s 
media reforms and the specialty of Chinese 
media system: fusion of Party control 
and market power (Zhao, 2004). It is no 
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longer negligible especially for local media to 
respond to public concerns and make profi ts.
In social media era, Weibo becomes 
the most important online discourse fi eld. 
The study found some differences between 
online public opinion and traditional media 
frames. In the beginning of the crisis, social 
media and traditional media both frequently 
applied defi ning problems frame. Though 
on Weibo, moral judgments frame was 
more salient in Phase 1. This could be 
explained by the regular circulation of 
the information that people tended to ask 
about what happened in the beginning, then 
searching for the reasons and solutions. The 
frame pattern in the crisis also evolved from 
problem defi nition to remedy suggestion 
(Zhou & Moy, 2007; Entman, 1993). 
But it is worth to notice that moral 
judgments frame was salient on Weibo 
throughout the whole period. A social media 
appeared quite emotional with people largely 
expressing their feelings such as anger, 
compassion, grief, etc. when a crisis event 
occurred. Moral judgments frame was also 
frequently applied by traditional media. 
Unlike social media, it was more about a 
sophisticated portrayal of some individual 
stories to resonate with the public such as 
compassion. But online opinions about this 
article were not exactly identical, though 
most of the netizens deeply grieved for the 
fi refi ghters, there were also a large number 
of people criticizing the current fi refi ghting 
system and appealing for a more strict and 
comprehensive training for the practitioners 
in order to reduce the number of casualties. 
Thus, the voices and frames on social media 
were more diversifi ed than in traditional 
media, which portrayed the individual stories 
mainly in a positive manner. Wang (2013) 
pointed out the diversity of online opinion 
and competing of different frames refl ected 
the fragmented Chinese society and publics. 
The prevalence of moral judgment frame in 
newspapers was also consistent with prior 
studies indicating traditional media frequently 
used human interest frame to resonate with 
audiences’ compassion for victims (Yang, 
2009).
The researchers also notice that in 
the beginning and the end of the event, 
traditional media mainly focused on 
defi ning problems. While in the middle of 
the event, it utilized more diagnosing cause 
frame, which correspond the journalistic 
norms of providing factual information 
about what happened, and digging out the 
buried reasons behind the story, especially 
when the incident was complicated and 
rumors could easily spread in online 
sphere. In this regard, Chinese traditional 
media plays an essential role in informing 
the public and keeps a rational image in 
crisis reporting (Hong & Choi, 2010).
As the event went on, the use of 
suggesting remedies frame increased 
distinctly on social media. The netizens 
provided solutions and tried to push 
forward the investigation process and even 
some social reforms relying on the power 
of online community and public opinion. 
But, it remains unclear whether the online 
public opinion could effectively infl uence 
the policy-makers, since Zhou and Moy 
(2007, p.93) suggested that in authoritarian 
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system, the frame-building power may not 
reach the policy level.
As to the last research part, this paper 
demonstrated strong frame interplay between 
online public opinion and news coverage 
on national crisis especially regarding fame 
building and frame setting, which was 
consistent with prior fi ndings (Hong, 2009). 
In this study, traditional media’s frame-setting 
effect was more dominant than social media’s 
frame-building effect. Traditional media 
served as important information sources 
for Weibo and exerted framing strategies in 
different phases to guide or shape the public 
opinion in a way that the government or 
news organizations hoped (Meraz, 2009). 
However, social media played an important 
role in transforming the original event into 
an infl uential issue (Zhou, 2007). Thereby, it 
prompted crisis managers to take measures as 
soon as possible. 
Although China’s social media, Weibo, 
owns large popularity in China whose online 
discourse imposes more or less infl uence on 
media coverage, the platform is censored 
by the Chinese government, meanwhile the 
traditional media is controlled by authorities 
or interest groups (Zhao, 2000; Auer & Fu, 
2015). Thus, the infl uence of social media 
on traditional media is limited just as the 
study demonstrated that it only signifi cantly 
infl uenced defi ning problems frame of 
traditional media during the middle period 
(Phase 2, 3, 4). 
However, traditional media appeared 
more salient than social media in this 
frame interplay, for traditional media could 
effectively set the frames of defi ning problems, 
diagnosing causes, and suggesting remedies to 
social media at different phases. On the other 
hand, the crisis event itself attracted more 
netizens’ attention to read media coverage 
to track the issue and government’s crisis 
management. News reporting also served as 
essential sources of information for online 
discussion. Thus, over a crisis event, social 
media’s framing effect is less infl uential than 
traditional media. This just confi rms and 
expands Etter and Vestergaard’s (2015) study 
on Facebook’s framing effect on news media 
that traditional media takes the dominance in 
the crisis event over social media, no matter 
in a democratic or non-democratic discourse. 
We suggest future research on how the degree 
of democracy infl uences the framing interplay 
between social media and traditional media.
In addition, the fi ndings of signifi cant 
framing effect with both one-phase (3 
days) lag and two-phase lag (6 days) in the 
study expand prior studies (Zhou, 2007; 
Etter & Vestergaard, 2015), applying 7-day 
time lag. Framing interplay could happen 
within fewer days between social media 
and traditional media and the phase setting 
could infl uence the statistical analysis. 
This study sheds light on the framing 
strategies for both the public opinion and 
news media. The public frames could push 
news media and policy makers to take 
responsibilities in specifi c phase. The media 
and policy makers apply targeted frame 
to control the fl ow of public opinion. In 
addition, policy makers or crisis managers 
could gain insight into public frames and 
predict future “reputation threats” among 
the public opinion (Coombs, 2011). 
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CONCLUSION
This study found some differences of 
crisis reporting between the Communist 
Party’s media and commercial media, 
demonstrating the bifurcation between 
Chinese media regulated by the government 
and by the market. The study also analyzed 
the framing process in social media and 
traditional media. Different framing 
patterns were also examined, as well as 
the complex interplay between the two 
including frame-building and frame-setting 
process. 
The commercial media in China 
appeared more a critical fact-fi nder 
than party media by analyzing more of 
accountabilities. The party media, however, 
appeared more prudent by resonating 
with the public, to emphasize the role of 
government and to build a positive image. 
Social media was more emotional 
and solution-oriented, with more remedy 
suggestions and moral judgments, than 
traditional media which more on to problems 
defi ning and diagnosing. Additionally, 
traditional media exerted more framing 
power than social media over the crisis 
event. Traditional media restructured the 
generic frames of social media by adapting 
its own frames, in order to manipulate the 
fl ow of public opinion. While social media 
could transform a crisis event into an 
infl uential issue to compel news media to 
track the event and crisis managers to take 
measures. However, this study is not free of 
limitations. This case study demonstrates 
different logics of crisis coverage, but it 
could also be lack of generalizability.
For future research, other than the 
content analysis of social media posts 
and newspaper reports, we suggest a 
complementary qualitative approach to 
examine how traditional media and social 
media quote each other during different 
phases over the event to understand this 
interplay better. Our fi nding might be 
infl uenced by the variance of phase settings. 
It is not clear yet about the methodologically 
decide regarding the optimum time span in 
frame-setting and agenda-setting studies 
(Lee et. al., 2005). Thus, it is necessary for 
future examination to tackle this problem 
both theoretically and empirically.
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